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H. S. Burness, R. G. Cummings, A. F. Mehr and M. S.
Walbert*

Valuing Policies Which Reduce
Environmental Risk
INTRODUCTION
Benefit-cost analysis has become an important part of the Reagan
Administration's method for evaluating environmental regulations.' The
use of such an analysis in evaluating many environmental regulations is
limited, however, because of the public goods qualities of the effects of
these regulations. For example, cleaner air resulting from air quality
standards, or improved public health and safety due to the regulation of
toxic waste disposal, do not have the market counterparts capable of
producing market established values (prices). Benefit-cost analyses for
many proposed environmental regulations are, therefore, impossible since
the value of the beneficial effects of the regulation cannot be determined.
The conundrum has resulted in considerable research being focused on
ways of valuing public goods. One method of particular interest involves
the use of survey techniques and is known as the bidding game or contingent valuation (CV) method. The CV method involves a survey in
which a hypothetical market is described to an interviewee wherein a
"commodity," such as cleaner air or a safer environment, is to be exchanged. The interviewee is then asked for his/her maximum willingness
to pay for this "commodity."
As one might expect, considerable controversy surrounds the reliablity
and interpretation of values derived from the CV method. 2 Two points
of controversy are of particular importance. The first is whether an environmental effect can be adequately described as a "commodity" to be
exchanged in the CV market. The second is whether the hypothetical
character of the CV market precludes the derivation of values which
reliably reflect the interviewee's preferences between income (other goods)
and the environmental "commodity" in question.
This paper deals with the two points given above. These questions are
addressed within the context of the authors' efforts to value benefits that
might result from Environmental Protection Agency regulations on the
Jisposal of (non-nuclear) toxic wastes. Hypotheses to be tested are de*Department of Economics, University of New Mexico.
1. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13, 193 (1981).
2. See the papers by Bishop and Randall in this issue of the NAT. RES. J.
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veloped below, empirical results are discussed, and conclusions are suggested.
THE POLICY BID EXPERIMENT
Some environmental regulations may result in effects which are well
defined and which can be precisely described. An example is a regulation
having the effect of prohibiting the construction of power plants in the
Grand Canyon area, with the resulting preservation of unimpaired visibility in that area. 3 Considerable uncertainty surrounds the effects of many
other environmental regulations, however. For example, consider a regulation requiring toxic wastes to be fully contained (they cannot enter the
environment) for some given number of years, wherever they are disposed
of in the land. Unfortunately, the effects of such a regulation in terms of
reducing health/safety risks cannot be quantified due to the uncertainty
of factors such as which wastes are, in fact, toxic; adequate methods for
their disposal; and the long term implications of a total containment
policy. 4 Thus, while the cost for such a regulation might be defined (aside
from enforcement costs, the cost of constructing and monitoring waste
disposal sites), "benefit" effects cannot be defined and, therefore, valued.
Put another way, the "commodity" traditionally used in the CV methodreduced environmental risk in this example--cannot be defined.
For cases where benefits cannot be defined,' a method for defining a
meaningful commodity to be valued in a CV study is suggested by the
recent works of Dr. Talbot Page. In considering the risks in the management of toxic substances, a regulator must consider two potential errors
associated with any environmental policy. Page argues as follows:
The first is the risk of taking precautionary action for a chemical
which is safe (a regulatory false positive). The second is the risk of
not controlling a chemical which is unsafe, and which would be
controlled with better information (a regulatory false negative). In
the majority of cases . . . , decisions are made under pervasive
uncertainty. A decision to postpone precautionary action until there
is better data is just as much a decision under uncertainty as a decision
to take precautionary action in the meantime. In fact, the crucial
decision is what to do "in the meantime" while uncertainties are far
3. D. S. Brookshire, R. G. Cummings, M. Rahmadan, W. D. Schulze & M. A. Thayer, Experimental Approaches for Valuing Environmental Commodities, draft, final report to the EPA,
Report on Grant # CR808-893-01, Wash., D.C., April, 1982.
4. See A. METRY, THE HANDBOOK OF HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT (1980);
also, D. DONIGER, THE LAW AND POLICY OF TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL (1978).
5. This problem is discussed in the case of nuclear waste disposal in R. G. Cummings, H. S.
Burness & R. D. Norton, The Proposed Waste Isolation Pilot Project and Impacts in the State of
New Mexico, New Mexico Energy and Minerals Dept., Report EMD 2-67-1139, Santa Fe, April,
1981.
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from resolution. The central fact about decisionmaking under uncertainty is the risk of (a false positive) "trades off" against the risk
of (a false negative). .

.

. The essence of the balancing process is a

willingess to accept some (false6 positives) as the unavoidable means
of controlling false negatives.
Based on Page's arguments given above, one sees the substance of a
well-defined commodity attributable to the proposed regulation which
might be used in the CV method. This "commodity" is the regulation
itself and the uncertainty surrounding it. This is to say that the effect
(commodity) of the regulation which is of interest in the CV method is
a hedge against future uncertain threats to health and safety. The CV
commodity is then described as just that: a regulation, the need for and
7
effects from which are uncertain, which simply hedges the health "bet."
For the CV study described below, the EPA regulation (or policy) with
its associated uncertainties, is used as the commodity for which values
(or "bids") are elicited. The study is, therefore, described as a Policy
Bid experiment.
Turning now to the potential for hypothetical biases in CV bids or
values for our policy/commodity, our concern is with the extent to which
participants in the CV survey are in fact "willing to pay" their offered
bid. In offering a bid, are they cognizant of what they must give up, in
terms of savings or other purchases, in order to actually pay their offered
bid? Have they considered other public goods (other regulations, for
example) that they might wish to "buy," purchases which might be
precluded by their actual payment of the bid offered for the toxic waste
disposal policy/commodity? Affirmative responses to these questions have
been assumed in most earlier studies. In this study, we wish to examine
the extent to which these assumptions may be viable.
The following techniques were used in an effort to induce interviewees
to consider values offered for our policy/commodity in greater depth. All
survey participants received an explanation of the general nature of the
toxic waste disposal issue, as well as a detailed explanation of our policy/
commodity. 9 Three successive values were then elicited from all interviewees:
PC: The "payment card" value: individuals were asked to choose
6. P. Talbot, A Framework for Unreasonable Risk in the Toxic Substance Control Act, California
Institute of Technology, Social Science Working Paper 308, Pasadena, CA, 1981, 68.
7. See Brookshire, supra note 3, chap. 6.
8. Id.
9. Space limitations prevent extensive discussion and description of the questionnaire; this information is available from the authors.
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their maximum willingness to pay 0 for our commodity from
an array of values given on a payment card.
MB: a "maximum bid": after choosing their PC, individuals were
asked to suppose that payments of (their) PC were insufficient
to implement the policy-Would they pay $1.00 more? Would
they pay $2.00 more? This bidding process continued until
they would pay no more.
OG: an "other good" bid: after providing the MB value, interviewees were shown a list of "other goods" of a public nature
(regulations, policies concerning the environment), and were
told that "acquiring" any of these goods might necessitate
payment on their part. The individual was then asked if he/
she was still willing to pay the MB amount for our toxic waste
policy/commodity.
The three values described above were obtained from all survey participants. The interview was limited to the above questions for roughly
half of those surveyed (Group A). For the other half of the survey population (Group B), explicit budget information was acquired prior to the
allocation of this income to the following expenditure categories: housing/
utilities, food, recreation/entertainment, savings, and other. The PC (then
MB and OG) value was then elicited, along with the request that the
individual indicate the expenditure category which will (necessarily) be
reduced upon payment of the offered value.
These techniques were used to induce individuals to consider tradeoffs implied by offering to pay some amount for implementing our toxic
waste disposal policy ("buying" the CV commodity). They were asked
to focus on their maximum willingness to pay, moving from PC to MB.
In offering OG, they were asked to consider their bids within the context
of other potentially purchasable public goods. Half of the interviewees
were asked to consider their offered bids within the explicit context of
their actual monthly expenditures and those necessarily reduced in order
to pay their offered bids.
Let subscripts A and B on the mean value of PC denote bids/values
obtained from individuals in groups A and B. We will be concerned with
the following null hypotheses.
(H. 1)

HYPOTHESES
PC = MB

(H.2)

MB = OG

QUESTION ASKED
1. Is the initial payment card bid a
maximum willingness to pay?
2. Does introducing other public
goods affect the bid?

10. The payment vehicle used here is "higher taxes and/or higher prices for the goods and services
that you buy."
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(H.3)

PCA = PCB

3. Does explicit use of the budget
constraint affect the PC value?

The CV Questionnaire sketched above was administered to 74 individuals in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and 84 individuals in Houston,
Texas, over the period of January 1 through November 20, 1982. Athome interviews were arranged by phone. In Albuquerque, telephone
numbers were obtained from a random numbers generator using data from
the telephone directory. In Houston, telephone numbers were drawn from
telephone exchanges in areas defined by the Research Triangle Institute.
Results from these surveys provide the data required for testing the hypotheses given above.
SURVEY RESULTS
Hypotheses H.1-H.3 are to be tested using regression techniques.
For hypothesis H.3, for example, the regression equation takes the form
PC = co + a1 D + otY + U where the dependent variable PC is
represented by an (n + m) X 1 vector containing the n starting bids for
group A and the m starting bids for group B, D is a dummy variable
represented by an (n + m) X 1 vector of n zeros and m ones denoting
whether the observation was drawn from group A or group B, Y is the
respondent's income, U is random disturbance, and the oti are parameters.
The parameter ot, is interpreted as the income adjusted "group effect"
on PC. That is, if the least squares estimate, cti, for a, is not statistically
different from zero, then one accepts the hypothesis PCA = PCB. If ot,
is significantly different from zero, D significantly affects the average bid
and one rejects the hypothesis PCA = PCB.
Thus, for each hypothesis which compares one WTP (W1 ; i = 1, 2)
value with another, the hypothesis that is statistically tested is Ho: a1 =
0. If t* is the t-statistic for cxi, tc is the critical value for t, then, for each
hypothesis:
t*

tc

-

reject H. -- * reject W,

t* < tc _4 accept

=

H, _4 accept W,

W29
=

W2.

A summary of survey results in given in Table 1. Data to be used for
testing hypotheses H. 1-H.3 are given in Table 2.
As stated above, our primary concern is with the extent to which
individuals, when valuing a commodity in a CV study, will go beyond
the hypothetical nature of the CV "market" and consider the trade-offs
involved in actually paying their offered valuation. That is, do individuals
think about their preferences for the CV commodity in terms of income,
or other goods and services, which must be given up if they are in fact
to pay their offered value?
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TABLE 1

SUMMARY OF SURVEY RESULTS
Sample
Size

Average
Income
(000)

PC

MB

OG

Albuquerque

74

$27.4

$13.90

$21.32

$14.20

Houston

84

$44.9

$17.06

$29.62

$17.15

Survey Area/Group

Mean Values For

Our experiment proceeded as follows. The payment card value was
elicited. In introducing the bidding process (obtaining MB), we asked:
are you sure of this (PC) offer? The hypothesis H. 1 tested the response
for the difference between PC and MB. After obtaining MB, the interviewee was asked to consider his/her bid (MB) within the context of
other goods that he/she might wish to "purchase." To obtain the value
of OG, we again asked the question: are you sure of this (now, MB)
offer? The hypothesis H.2 tested the response for the difference between
MB and OG values. In addition to eliciting two sets of responses (in
Albuquerque and in Houston) to these "are you sure" questions, we
inquired into the effect on CV response of focusing the interviewee's
attention on what must be given up, in terms of his/her present consumption/expenditure patterns, in order to "pay" the offered value for
our policy/commodity. Hypothesis 3 tests for any difference in offered
values between those with (Group B) and without (Group A) this explicit
budget information.
Results relevant for our "are you sure" questions are summarized in
Table 3. In the Albuquerque survey, respondents in Group A were unsure
of their value. Further, they were not "sure" (they changed this bid) when
TABLE 2
DATA FOR TESTING HYPOTHESES
Value of cq (t-statistic) in:
Hypotheses

Albuquerque
7.43
(2.058)

H.A

PC = MB

H.2

MB = OG

-7.13
(-1.779)

H.3

PCA = PC

.60
(.146)

Houston
12.70
(2.790)
12.92
(-2.718)
6.47
(1.607)
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TABLE 3
OVERVIEW OF THE VALUATION PROCESS
IMPLIED*
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS:
STEPS IN THE
VALUATION PROCESS

Albuquerque

Houston

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

1. Obtain Payment Card Value
"Are You Sure of Your Bid?"
(Hypothesis H. 1)
2. Obtain Maximum Bid
"Are You Sure of Your Bid?"
(Hypothesis H.2)
3. Introduce Other Goods
"Does Explicit Consideration of
Income/Expenditures Affect
Individual Valuations?"
(Hypothesis H.3)

*Response implied from analysis of t-statistics for the a, coefficients given in Table 2.

asked to consider other goods. One may interpret this result as suggesting
some difficulty on the part of respondents with the hypothetical nature
of the CV market: when asked to focus more sharply on trade-offs implied
by their offered payment, respondents changed their bid. The potential
for using the budget information technique for breaking the "hypothetical
barrier" in CV analysis failed in the Houston experiment and in Albuquerque. The budget technique (step 4 in Table 3) did not seem to affect
the offered value.
Thus, except in cases where budget information was used, individual
valuations changed with each effort to induce the individual to consider
the implications of their offered value: the bidding process changed (increased) the offered value; consideration of other goods changes (decreased) the offered value (Table 2). This instability in valuations as the
respondent received additional information makes suspect the notion that
individuals viewed their offered values outside of the hypothetical context
of the CV "market."
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The above empirical results and their interpretations must necessarily
be viewed as tentative at this stage of the authors' research. The reader
should note that interpretations were intentionally exaggerated in an effort
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to focus attention on key conceptual issues of relevance in attempts to
analyze potential biases (particularly hypothetical bias) in public goods
valuation drawn from the CV method. For example, the instability of
valuations obtained in the Houston survey may reflect considerations
unrelated to hypothetical bias per se. Two of the possible biases are
preference characteristics thus far unidentified in our analysis and an
interviewee's lack of understanding of the policy/commodity offered in
the CV process.
With these caveats in mind, one may consider implications of results
in Tables 1-3 for estimates of individual maximum willingness to pay
for the implementation of government policy designed to hedge against
environmental risk. For households with annual incomes of $40,000 and
$25,000, bids in Albuquerque were $10.39 per month and $9.79 per
month, respectively; corresponding bids in Houston (for the same income
level) were $28.30 and $20.35 per month, respectively." Even at the
lower range of $10.00 per month, however, substantial social benefits
might be attributed to policies designed to reduce environmental risk,
notwithstanding uncertainties surrounding such risks. With about 70 million households in the United States, annual benefits could be approximately $8.4 billion.
The potential for significant hypothetical bias, as well as other biases,
in public goods valuations from survey methods remains an important
issue. Results reported here support, as well as contradict, conclusions
from earlier work which focus on such biases. 2 Continued interest and
research in this area are clearly warranted, given, first, the importance
of the public goods issue and, second, the lack of apparent alternatives
to some form of the survey method in deriving valuations for large classes
of public (environmental) goods.

I1. From Table 2, income was a significant determinant of the bid in Houston, but not in
Albuquerque.
12. Brookshire, supra note 3, chap. 6.

